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Viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) are severe and life-
threatening diseases that have been reported in parts 
of Africa, South America, the Middle East, Central Asia 
and Europe. They are capable of causing long-term and 
slow burning epidemics, which can interrupt normal 
life, trade and impact the social structure of a com-
munity [1]. The known viruses responsible for VHFs are 
not genetically related and are classified in disparate 
virus families; they include members of the  Arenvirid
ae,  Flaviviridae,  Filoviridae,  Nairoviridae  and  Phenuvir
idae  (Table). They circulate in animal reservoirs and 
sometimes arthropod vectors; humans are not part 
of their natural life cycle, but incidental infection and 
introduction into the human population often results 
in an outbreak. VHFs are described as hazard or risk 
group 4 pathogens [2,3] and warrant maximum labora-
tory containment facilities and working precautions i.e. 
containment or biosafety level 4.
VHFs are of particular public health importance 
because they can spread within hospital and commu-
nity settings; they have a high case fatality rate if left 
untreated; they are difficult to recognise and detect 
rapidly; and there is no specific treatment. In Europe, 
environmental conditions do not support the natural 
animal reservoirs or vectors of most of the haemor-
rhagic fever viruses, and in consequence the majority 
of recorded cases of VHF in Europe have been acquired 
overseas. A notable exception to this rule is the 
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus which occa-
sionally infects humans. It circulates unobtrusively 
between mammals and ticks in southern parts of west 
and eastern Europe [4]. Autochthonous cases of other 
VHFs have infrequently occurred in Europe and, with 
the exception of a laboratory worker who sustained a 
needle-stick injury in the United Kingdom (UK) in 1976 
[5], these have been associated with transmission from 
index cases to healthcare workers [6,7]. Such incidents 
attract interest and ultimately help our understanding 
of disease transmission, leading to improvements in 
the risk assessment and management of VHFs. Over 
the past decade, Europe has faced a total of 21 differ-
ent incursions of VHF [8-14].
In this issue of Eurosurveillance two articles by Lehmann 
et al. and Ehlkes et al. [15,16] provide further insight to 
the VHF community by detailing the most recent impor-
tation of Lassa fever (LF) into Germany in 2016 and its 
onward transmission to an undertaker. The incident 
highlights difficulties and delays in the diagnosis of 
the index case, principally because the country where 
the infection was acquired – Togo – had not previously 
been known as an endemic area of Lassa fever virus 
(LASV). The index case died soon after admission and 
a post-mortem was performed. Although this did not 
disclose the immediate cause of death, liver sections 
displayed classic features of VHF, and LASV was sub-
sequently detected in a laboratory test. Unfortunately, 
this diagnosis occurred after the patient, the body and 
tissue samples had come into contact with health-
care workers and others on multiple occasions in the 
absence of specific precautions required for a hazard 
group 4 pathogen. Extensive effort in contact tracing, 
risk categorisation, interviewing and reporting then 
ensued. Symptom monitoring in contacts was compli-
cated by a peak in activity of the influenza season and 
plans to avoid the unnecessary triggering of enhanced 
control measures such as isolation or quarantine were 
developed with an underpinning and basic scientific 
knowledge of LASV and human disease. An undertaker, 
who had contact with the body 6 days after death, 
was identified at increased risk following interview 
and while an early PCR test for LASV was negative, he 
tested positive 12 days post exposure. The undertaker 
was subsequently treated with ribavirin and made a 
full recovery; it is unclear how he became infected. 
None of the other 76 contacts who were followed up in 
the two concerned German federal states, North-Rhine-
Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate, were positive.
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Following an international alert after the confirmed 
diagnosis of the index case, another secondary trans-
mission was diagnosed in a healthcare professional 
who had cared for the index case in Togo. This patient 
was subsequently medevacked to the Unites States 
and made a full recovery following treatment.
The rodent reservoir of LASV - the Natal multimam-
mate rat  Mastomys natalensis  - is not supported by 
environmental conditions in Europe and LF does not 
pose a significant public health threat in this continent. 
Nevertheless, LF cases are the most commonly imported 
of the VHFs into Europe, with 21 traveller-related 
incidents since the virus was discovered in 1969; 
interestingly, 13 of these were to the UK [17]. Given the 
long-standing deep-seated links with Europe and the 
role of European workers in humanitarian support in 
West Africa, LF cases will continue to be imported into 
Europe. Each incident places a substantial demand on 
clinical, laboratory and public health resources [18]. 
It is fitting therefore that scientific knowledge is con-
tinually developed, including a better understanding of 
similar emerging viruses [19-30]. Lessons learnt should 
be continually distilled into appropriate guidance so 
that future VHF incidents can be effectively managed 
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Chapare mammarenavirus Rodentsb South America / Bolivia Chapare HF 7–14 70a [13]
Guanarito mammarenavirus Rodents Zygodontomys brevicauda
South America / 





South America / 





West Africa / 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Lassa fever 5–6 1 [16]





South America / 
Bolivia Bolivian HF 7–14 25 [18]
Sabiá mammarenavirus Rodentsb South America/ Brazil Brazilian HF 7–14 50a [19]
Flaviviridae
Yellow fever virus Monkeys / mosquitoes South America and Africa Yellow fever 3–6 20–50 [20]
Filoviridae
Ebolavirus Batsb Sub-Saharan Africa Ebola HF 2–21 50–80 [21]
Marburg virus Fruit bats Rousettus aegyptii
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Marburg HF 2–21 80 [21]
Nairoviridae
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever 
orthonairovirus







Crimean Congo HF 1–3 5–50 [22]
Phenuiviridae
Rift Valley fever virus phlebovirus Livestock ruminants / mosquitoes
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Rift Valley fever 2–6 1 [23]
Severe fever with 
thrombocytopenia syndrome 
phlebovirus
Deer / ticks China, South Korea Japan





HF: haemorrhagic fever; VHF: viral haemorrhagic fever.
a Some case fatality rates are based on low numbers of cases.
b Animal reservoirs suspected but not proven.
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and rapidly controlled as also pointed out by Ehlkes et 
al. and Lehmann et al..
From a global perspective, the ideal way to prevent 
imported infections would be to control the disease in 
West Africa. Rodent control and the reduction of con-
tact between humans and rodents and their excreta 
will help to prevent infection. Other control measures 
such as vaccination may offer a more sustainable solu-
tion. Indeed LF has been prioritised for research and 
development in public health emergency contexts by 
the World Health Organization [31] and several interna-
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